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Abstract 
We discuss some issues involved in modeling of complex systems composed of dynamically interacting agents. We describe a 
prototype of simulation environment created for modeling of such systems with the aim of evaluating strategies of enterprizes 
in the information economy, but applicable to general multi-agent systems. The case study is presented along with the 
mathematical description of the multi-agent systems. © 1998 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. 
Keywords: Multi-agent systems; Telecommunications; Bounded rationality; Simulation 
1. Introduction 
Market mechanisms are traditionally analyzed un-
der the strong assumption that all actions are made si-
multaneously at known equilibrium prices. The known 
adaptive (tatonnement) processes, attempting to ex-
plain how disequilibrium prices move towards an equi-
librium, converge also only under strong assumptions. 
One of them is the reversibility of decisions made at 
disequilibrium prices. This is a critical assumption for 
various imperfect and artificial markets. Thus in the 
case of so-called tradeable permit markets (12,13] the 
decision on the investments for pollution reduction 
(sale of permits) made at an early stage of the trading 
process can hardly be reversed at a later stage. 
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The irreversibility of decisions leads to inefficiency 
of standard tatonnement procedures and thin markets. 
It calls for approaches when the equilibrium prices 
can be found without making real decisions at dis-
equilibrium prices. One of them is to create an artificial 
multi-agent market system (12,13], where computers 
or "agents" of participants can simulate trading pro-
cesses and reach an equilibrium before making real 
decisions. 
The existence of such a market system with agreed 
upon rules on how it should function and anonymous 
decentralized exchange of necessary information al-
lows us to reach efficiency for incomplete markets. 
The design of multi-agent market systems requires 
special decomposition techniques and the use of (often 
stochastic [ 11]) optimization techniques. 
In this paper we describe an approach for model-
ing complex systems composed of independent enti-
ties called agents dynamically interacting with each 
other. The original aim was to create a simulation tool 
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for evaluation of strategies of enterprises in the new 
emerging information industry. This industry is devel-
oping now as a merger of telecommunications, com-
puter industry and content provision. In this context 
the modeled system is information economy and the 
agents are the enterprizes and business units involved 
in creation, production and distribution of informa-
tion products, network providers, consumers of infor-
mation products, government and regulation agencies. 
Such agents make decisions about consumption, trans-
formation and exchange of information and other re-
sources, expand their production facilities, formulate 
their strategies in order to achieve specific aims. These 
decisions are taken in asynchronous and distributed 
manner. Agents may combine different roles within 
economy, like content provision and delivery of in-
formation service. If carried far enough, this project 
could involve creation of virtual information economy. 
At this point we have created the prototype of agent-
based simulation system INFOGEN and the method-
ological framework for its further development. This 
paper summarizes the work done so far and indicates 
some directions for further research. Our contribution 
goes beyond our original aim of modeling informa-
tion economy. In fact, INFOGEN can be used poten-
tially for simulation of wide range of complex systems 
with distributed decision making operating in chang-
ing and/ or uncertain environment, for example finan-
cial markets. 
Modeling of information industry and, more gen-
erally, economic system undergoing rapid technologi-
cal and structural change, poses the challenges which 
are not yet fully addressed by traditional economic 
modeling. Some of these modeling challenges con-
sist in finding adequate approaches for treating non-
stationarity and uncertainty of economic environment, 
bounded rationality of economic agents, rich variety 
and complexity of dynamic interrelations between dif-
ferent agents. 
Nonstationarity. The large part of traditional eco-
nomic theory and modeling is centered around perfect 
markets in the state of equilibrium. In such systems 
the operation of market forces smooth out disturbances 
introduced by uncertainty and leads the system to er-
godic state of equilibrium. In case of rapid technologi-
cal change this is no longer the case because relatively 
small disturbances and decisions with small immedi-
ate impact can have self-magnifying properties due to 
the positive feedbacks present in the system (technolo-
gies with increasing returns) [4,5]. This leads to non-
ergodicity of the system which requires from modelt~r 
the shift of the emphasis from stationary to transient 
behavior. 
Uncertainty. The lack of ergodicity increases im-
portance of adequate treatment of uncertainty present 
in the system. There are two levels of uncertainty 
present in the system. There is external uncertainty 
represented by demand patterns, technological change 
and different kinds of random perturbations. Internal 
uncertainty is due to the fact that each agent takes deci-
sions without full knowledge about states and actions 
of other agents. Economic "particles" (agents, enter-
prises, countries) do not follow strong laws like the 
laws in mechanics and physics (for example, gravity 
law) . They have flexibility to choose different behav-
ioral patterns. Thus, both models of uncertainty and 
behavior of economic agents under uncertainty should 
be included in the system. 
Complexity. Traditional economic modeling deals 
with systems composed of fairly homogeneous agents 
with similar behavior patterns. We needed instead the 
capabilities to model rich variety of relations where the 
same agents can compete in one field and collaborate 
in another overlapping field, assume different combi-
nations of industry roles, possess different knowledge 
about the state of the whole system. This complexity 
leads to the multitude of positive and negative feed-
backs in the system which under different values of 
system parameters can lead to different equilibriums, 
and even chaotic behavior. Even without chaos the 
presence of multiple equilibria leads to catastrophic 
behavior, i.e. in certain points the system abruptly 
switches between different equilibria with arbitrarily 
small change of system parameters. Important objec-
tive here would be to define "robust" patterns and re-
gions of stability. 
Bounded rationality. Traditional economic theory 
assumes that economic agents are perfectly rational 
and their behavior is governed by maximization of 
certain utility function. Besides these ideal, "best 
case" scenarios, we included in our system some other 
models of agent behavior which assume the bounded 
rationality of agents, i.e. that their decision actions 
result from the set of heuristics which vary according 
to changing of information patterns, environment and 
goals [3]. Such heuristics may cause instability and 
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they are constantly being evaluated against obtained 
results and new heuristics are generated. 
Our objective was to create a system capable of 
modeling these features of information economy. In 
order to achieve this we draw upon recent method-
ological advances. In particular, simulation models of 
asynchronous systems were developed in the theory 
of discrete event dynamic systems (DEDS) together 
with interplay between simulation and optimization 
[2, JO, 18-21,24-26]. Decision making principles in 
the presence of uncertainty were considered in the 
field of stochastic programming [7,9,10,14,15,22,25]. 
Dynamic behavior of systems composed of inter-
acting agents was studied within the framework of 
evolutionary approach [1,4,5,8,23]. Related work in 
computational economy and market-oriented pro-
gramming resulted in creation of several tools for 
distributed resource allocation in financial and other 
fields [16,27-29] . 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Ar-
chitecture of the system INFOGEN is described in 
Section 2. Section 3 is dedicated to a case study 
of competition between the producers of an inno-
vative product. Section 4 contains the mathematical 
description of multi-agent system which underlies 
INFOGEN. 
2. Architecture of the system INFOGEN 
INFOGEN stands for INFOrmation economy mod-
eling through aGENt programming. In this section we 
provide an informal description of INFOGEN archi-
tecture. It is a discrete event simulator which con-
sists of three main components: resources, agents and 
market. It simulates the evolution of the economy as 
distributed transformation of resources by agents and 
exchange of resources through market. The mathe-
matical description of the general multi-agent system 
which underlies INFOGEN can be found in Section 4. 
2.I. Resources 
These are the elementary entities from which the 
system is composed. Or, they can be viewed as an al-
phabet in which the system is described. In our ter-
minology we consider resources any commodity or 
entity which is exchanged, satisfied, manufactured or 
in any other way changed by economic agents rele-
vant to modeling purposes. Thus, besides resources 
in the economic sense of the word other examples of 
resources are money, all kinds of products, services 
and needs. In our system resources are divided in five 
types: money, input resource, output resource, inter-
nal resource and final demand. 
Money. This is obligatory resource which is always 
present in the system and which flow is treated sepa-
rately from flow of other resources. This is due to its 
economic function of exchange and because perfor-
mance of agents is often measured in money terms. 
Input resources. These are the resources which are 
used by agents for creation of products and services 
and satisfaction of needs. For example, in the case of 
the agent representing an Internet provider one of the 
input resources may be the lines which he leases from 
a telephone company. In case of the agent representing 
an Internet user some of the input resources are fixed 
local phone service and the Internet connection. Input 
resources are bought by an agent at the market and 
may be stored. 
Output resources. These are the products and ser-
vices into which agents transform input resources and 
which are offered to the market. For example, for In-
ternet provider an output resource is the capacity to 
provide an Internet connection of given quality, while 
for telephone company the output resource is the ca-
pacity to provide a phone connection. From these ex-
amples it is clear that the output resources for one 
agent are the input resources for some other agents. 
Output resources can constitute the offers to the mar-
ket and they can be stored. 
Internal resources . These are resources which are 
possessed by agents and are necessary for transfor-
mation of the input resources into output resources. 
Examples of such resources are qualified manpower 
or production capacities. For example for Internet 
provider his Internet node would be his internal re-
source, for Internet user it would be his personal com-
puter and specialized software, for a phone company 
it is her network. Input resources can be expanded and 
otherwise developed and they should be subjected to 
maintenance. Money and input resources are needed 
for both maintenance and development. 
Final demand and needs. These are the final re-
sources which drive the economic activity of the sys-
tem. They are not transformed or exchanged in the 
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sytem and constitute needs and demands of the end 
user. What are the final resources very much depend 
on the purpose of the modeling. Suppose, for example, 
that we model the penetration of the new telecommu-
nication voice service, like voice over Internet. Then 
the final resource may be just "demand for voice over 
Internet" represented by some expert prediction. On 
the other hand we might be interested in looking closer 
how this demand is formed according to some hy-
potheses about behavior of customers and price and 
quality structure of competing voice services. In this 
case the final resource would be "the need for voice 
communication" measured, for instance, by distribu-
tion of time per day for various types of customers. 
Input resources in this case may be "fixed phone con-
nection", "mobile phone connection", "Internet con-
nection" and "other means". 
This resource structure is very flexible and can be 
easily modified by reassigning resources to different 
types and aggregation/disaggregation according to 
modeling needs. 
2.2. Agents 
Agents transform and exchange resources described 
previously. We developed generic agent structure 
which can be specialized in the rich collection of 
agents by specifying agent parameters for particular 
purposes. This structure permits to model a variety 
of economic actors from enterprizes to individual 
users. Such flexibility is important because we needed 
the capabilities to model agents which combine the 
multitude of industry roles. 
Roles. In the rapidly evolving information economy 
one of the most important issues for newly emerg-
ing company as well as for established industry leader 
is which industry roles to assume. Should established 
fixed network provider go into providing Internet ser-
vice, or form a strategic alliance with provider of cable 
television? Thorough analysis of information industry 
roles can be found in [6]. After preliminary analysis 
we understood that all industry roles except regulatory 
roles can be represented in the alphabet of resources 
described above, i.e. as transformation of specific set 
of resources into another set of resources and their ex-
change. From this resulted that the agents themselves 
can be represented in terms of this alphabet. 
Thus, the generic agent structure in our system con-
sists of resource sets, transformation functions and 
strategies. 
Resource sets. There is the total set of resources for 
all system. Each agent is characterized by four subsets 
of this set, i.e. set of input resources, set of output re-
sources, set of internal resources and set of needs. In-
put resources are all resources which are transformed 
by this particular agent into internal and output re-
sources and in need satisfaction. For particular agents 
generated from the general structure some of these sets 
may be empty. At each time moment the state of an 
agent is characterized by available money and internal 
resources and by stocks of input and output resources. 
Transformation functions. There are four sets of 
such functions in the general agent structure: produc-
tion functions, development functions, maintenance 
functions and satisfaction functions. Production func-
tions tell how much of money, internal and input 
resources are needed for production of the given quan-
tity of the output resource. They have the following 
structure: 
Vi= 1/r(a, v0 ) (!) 
where Vi is the volume of specific input or internal 
resource or money, v0 is the volume of the output re-
source and a are production parameters. In the sim-
plest case these functions could be linear, however we 
are specifically interested in case of increased returns 
and economies of scale. In such a case 1/r (a, ·) is a con-
cave function which may asymptoticaly tend to linear 
with increasing argument. The simplest case of such 
a function is the following : 
1 + a2Vo 
Vi =a1v0 , I + a3Vo 
where the case when a2 > a3 describes increasing re-
turns and a2 < a3 corresponds to diminishing returns. 
All other types of transformation functions have the 
same structure (I) as production functions. Develop-
ment functions describe amounts of input resources 
and money necessary for expanding production capa-
cities for a given amount. Maintenance functions de-
fine amount of money and input resources necessary 
for maintenance of internal resources and stocks of 
input and output resources. Satisfaction functions de-
fine amount of money and input resources necessary 
for satisfaction of a need. 
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Strategies . Strategies are actions which agents un-
dertake in order to achieve specific aims. Strategies 
depend on amount of money and other resources avail-
able to an agent and on information available on the 
states and strategies of other agents. The general agent 
structure includes three types of interrelated strate-
gies: pricing strategies, development strategies and 
purchasing strategies. All these strategies in some 
cases may be derived by solving dynamic optimization 
problems (see Section 4). In other cases such strategies 
can incorporate principles of adaptivity and bounded 
rationality. 
Pricing strategies. These strategies define the price 
which an agent offers for its output resources (products 
and services). In one of our case studies we imple-
mented the principles of bounded rationality as fol-
lows. Each agent had a set of several strategies: keep 
the market price, increase the price or decrease the 
price based on previous history. On each step an agent 
could choose from one of such strategies according 
to probabilities which were updated according to their 
performance in terms of income and revenue, similar 
to the theory of learning automata. 
Development strategies. If demand exceeded 
production capacities, an agent can choose between 
increasing the price or expanding production capaci-
ties. Development strategies govern such an expan-
sion taking into account that newly added capacities 
are becoming operational after some delay. 
Purchasing strategies. These strategies are em-
ployed by the agents for selection of offers for re-
quired input resources present in the market. The 
simplest strategy is, of course, to choose the offer 
with smallest price. We take into account, however, 
that for real economic agents the price considerations 
are not necessarily unique and allow customers to 
migrate between offers with different price with some 
dynamics dependent on other attributes of an offer. 
At this moment we implemented some basic set of 
strategies which is in the process of expansion. 
Specific agents are generated from this general 
agent structure by specifying its elements. Here are 
some types of the agents with which we experimented. 
Production agent. This agent puts on the market 
products and services producing them on production 
capacities using input resources bought on the market, 
but do not have final needs to satisfy. These agents 
further differ by their set of strategies. 
End user agent. This agent satisfies the final needs 
by purchasing products and services on the market. 
This agent is further characterized by capability to 
substitute different products to satisfy the same need. 
For example, the need for voice communication can be 
satisfied by fixed phone, mobile phone or voice over 
Internet. 
Pure supplier. This agent has only output resource 
which supplies for the price derived from the expert 
estimates. This agent is useful to model supply of im-
portant products which flow we do not want to describe 
in much detail due to modeling purposes. One exam-
ple is the regulatory commission which distributes fre-
quences for broadcast transmission. 
2.3. Market 
Market is the environment in which agents operate. 
Each period of time agents which produce output re-
sources put their offers on the market. Each offer con-
sists of quantity and price of specific resource. Agents 
which are customers for the input resources go to the 
market and choose between offers. For the case when 
demand exceeds supply the system has the set of rules 
which distribute available supply between customers. 
Producing agents may then decide to increase the price 
for the next period and/ or to expand production ca-
pacities. There is the set of balancing mechanisms 
which are needed because unsatisfied demand of one 
agent may result in decreasing of its offer to the mar-
ket which in turn may result in diminishing satisfac-
tion of demand of other agent. One possibility is to 
use the generalizations of Walras tatonnement process 
(11,29). 
3. Case study: competition of producers of an 
innovative product 
In order to illustrate our modeling approach we 
present in this section a simple but illuminating case 
study. Consider a market which caters for satisfaction 
of some need of pool of end users. At some point as 
the result of technological innovation appears some 
other product, or several products which can satisfy 
the same need, but in some new way or some new 
aspect of it. Some companies, old or new, start to de-
velop these products and offer them to the market. 
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Doing so they can adopt different development and 
market strategies. It is important to understand which 
parameters of such strategies are crucial for success. 
There are many examples of such situation in the 
present technological reality. Consider, for example, 
the recent developments in provision of voice telecom-
munications. The need of the end users to be satis-
fied is the need of remote communication by voice. 
There was established market with traditional product 
which is fixed telephony. Then appeared new services 
like mobile telephony and very recently the possibility 
of voice through Internet. Another example is video 
on demand versus more traditional film distribution 
like cinema and video rentals . Still another example is 
the competition between different Internet providers 
which compete between themselves and against tradi-
tional means of provision of information services. 
In what follows we present a simplified description 
how this situation can be modeled with the help of 
INFOGEN and some results of experimentation. Let 
us follow the description of INFOGEN architecture 
presented in the previous section. 
Resources. In the simplest case we have five re-
sources in the system: money, end user need, tradi-
tional product, innovative product (may be more then 
one), and production capability of innovative product. 
Agents. There are three types of agents present in 
the system: end users, producers of innovative product, 
and suppliers of traditional product. 
End users. They operate on four of the resources 
defined above: end user need, two input resources 
(traditional product and innovative product) and 
money. Their production function describes how fixed 
amounts of traditional and innovative products sat-
isfy their need, taking into account the possibility 
to substitute one product by another. Their strategy 
consists of two components: maximization of need 
satisfaction given amount of money available each 
period and purchasing strategy according to which 
they select between offers of producers of innovative 
product. 
Producers of innovative product. In the simplest 
case they operate on three resources : money, produc-
tion capacity as internal resource and innovative pro-
duct as output resource. In this case the only resource 
whici1 is used for expansion of production capacity is 
money. For more detailed modeling production capa-
cities may be disaggregated and input resources may 
be added for both production and capacity expansion. 
Production, development and maintenance functions 
of these agents describe how much money and pro-
duction capacity is needed for production of the given 
quantity of innovative product and how much money is 
needed for production capacity expansion and mainte-
nance. These agents have the pricing strategy and pro-
duction expansion strategy. We modeled several types 
of these agents which differ by their strategy sets. 
Suppliers of traditional product. In the simplest case 
this agent operates only one resource: traditional pro-
duct which is the output resource for him. It has in-
finite stock of this resource which he supplies to the 
market for given price which may vary between time 
periods. In more involved modeling we might be in-
terested in possible strategies of this type of agents for 
countering the invasion of the new product, in this case 
it is necessary to specify the structure of this agent in 
more detail. 
We used INFOGEN for different experiments with 
this model. We have found that the behavior of the 
system very much depends on the set of strategies 
adopted by different producers of innovative product 
and on parameters of such strategies. System may tend 
to equilibrium in which some producers will conquer 
certain market shares, while others will perish. There 
are multiple equilibria which are characterized by dif-
ferent sets of survived agents and the system may 
switch between different such equilibria in discontinu-
ous fashion, i.e. with arbitrarily small change of strat-
egy parameters. In some cases the system can exhibit 
chaotic behavior with different producers having their 
market shares oscillate widely. 
Two sets of experiments are presented here in or-
der to illustrate these points. The first set is comprised 
by Figs. 1-4. In this case there are two identical pro-
ducers of innovative product which differ from their 
market strategies. The first agent sets its price inde-
pendently selecting on each step from several adaptive 
strategies according to their past performance with re-
spect to revenue maximization. The second agent has 
the information about the price adopted by the first 
agent and varies his price around the price of the first 
agent again according to adaptive strategies. In these 
figures the upper straight line represents the maximal 
possible value of the market for the innovative product, 
i.e. in the case when all traditional product is substi-
tuted. The lower horizontal line represents the half of 
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the maximal market value, this is the reasonable mar-
ket share for each agent since they are identical. The 
thick upper curve represents the total market for the 
innovative product and two lower intertwined curves 
represent revenues of individual agents. 
Figs. 1-4 represent various patterns of market evolu-
tion depending on the parameters of the market strate-
gies of the agents. In Fig. I we have the total collapse 
of the market for the innovative product followed by 
near collapse with rebound in Fig. 2 and the victory of 
the innovative product in Fig. 3. Fig. 4 represents the 
case of chaotic behavior with survival of both tradi-
tional and innovative products and oscillations of mar-
ket shares both between new and traditional products 
and between manufacturers of the new product. 
Example of discontinuous switch between dif-
ferent equilibrium points is presented in Figs. 5-8. 
Here again we have two identical agents this time 
defining their market strategies independently. They 
differ, however, from their initial market share and 
from the capability of rapidly, or decisively react 
to observed revenue fluctuations measured by one 
of the strategy parameters which we call reaction 
parameter. In reality such greater flexibility may be 
caused by larger innovation capacity. The larger the 
reaction parameter, the larger the variations the agent 
can introduce in its prices. In all four cases the first 
agent has larger initial market share and the value of 
reaction parameter fixed to 0.05 . In Fig. 5 the second 
agent has the same value of reaction parameter as the 
fi rst agent and the larger initial market share proves 
to be decisive: the first agent quickly conquers the 
whole market. While the second agent increases its 
reaction parameter it survives longer and longer and 
fi nally between values 0.066657 and 0.066658 the 
system changes equilibrium in a discontinuous (catas-
trofic) fashion : the second player starts to win the 
whole market share (Figs. 6 and 7) which continues 
with the further increase of the reaction parameter 
(Fig. 8). 
4. Mathematical description of underlying 
multi-agent system 
This section contains a more precise mathematical 
description of the multi-agent system which under-
lies INFOGEN described in Section 2. It should be 
read keeping in mind informal explanations of this 
section. 
4.1. Definition of resources 
We consider the set W of n resources v; , i 
I , . . . , n. Each of these resources can be character-
ized by its quantity z;, and the vector of other at-
tributes v; = (v; 1, ... , v;K,) . Some of the components 
of these vectors can be continuous, while others can 
be discrete. For example, among these attributes can 
be quality for information resources, or packet loss 
for connections in data network. The values of these 
quantities belong to specified sets : 
Z; E Z;, v; EV; . 
Often there are additional constraints on the possible 
values of quantities and attributes which can be ex-
pressed in the following way: 
(z; , v;) E Y;k. k = l , . . . , M;, 
Y;k ~ Z; x V;. (2) 
We treat money here as special resource vo E W 
which has an empty attribute, thus money is charac-
terized by the couple (zo , 0) where zo is the amount 
of money. 
4.2. Structure of resource space 
The space of resources can be associated with ori-
ented resource graph (W, A). The set W of vertices 
of this graph coincide with the set of resources while 
the set of oriented arcs A ~ W x W defines re-
source transformations. Let us explain this in more 
detail. 
For each v; E W let us denote by wt the set of all 
vertices from which oriented arcs point to v; and by 
W;- the set of all vertices to which oriented arcs point 
from v; : 
wt= {vr (vj. v;) EA}, 
wi- = {vr (v; , Vj) EA}. 
The set W;+ is called consumption set for resource 
v; because it is constituted from all resources which 
are consumed in the process of "production" or 
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"transformation" of resource v; and the set W;- is 
constituted from all resources for which transforma-
tion the resource v; is needed. 
The resources v; for which wt = 0 are called pri-
mary resources. They are not transformed within the 
system and are taken from outside. As far as modeling 
of information industry is concerned, the examples of 
such a resource are land or manpower. 
The resources v; for which W;- = 0 are called fi -
nal resources . Such resources are not used in further 
transformations within the system. In our case exam-
ples of such resources are needs of the end users and 
the government. 
Resources v; for which wt =F 0 are produced or 
transformed within the system. With each such re-
source is associated the production function: 
(3) 
which defines the quantity z; and attributes v; of 
resource v; which can be obtained from resources 
belonging to consumption set taken in quantities Zj 
with attributes Vj. Sometimes production function can 
be approximated by a linear function with respect to 
quantities: 
Z; = L c(v;, Vj)Zj. 
j:v1ewi+ 
where c( v;, Vj) are some coefficients which depend 
on the attributes of respective resources. More often 
this is monotonously increasing concave function of 
quantities which reflects economy of scale. 
With each production function (3) is associ-
ated expenditure function which defines the amount 
of money 11; necessary to purchase the resources 
(Zj, Vj)i;eWt' 
(4) 
Often this is a linear function of resource quanti-
ties. 
4.3. Role layer 
Roles define relations and structures on the produc-
tion graph defined above and are associated with dif-
ferent operations which can be applied to resources. 
We consider here only transformation roles. Such roles 
are responsible for transformation of one resources 
into others. Many structural and infrastructural roles 
of information industry fit into this category, among 
them information and information service production, 
provision and brokerage roles. 
Each such role is associated with some subset B 
of vertices of production graph, B c W. Different 
resources belonging to B have different functions 
within this subset. Some of them are principal re-
sources, others depend on principal resources. Let 
us consider, for example, information production 
role, like production of movies. In this case there 
is principal resource which is movie and secondary 
resource which is promotion material about movie. 
According to different functions of resources be-
longing to the subset B of a particular role this role 
can be subdivided into subroles, some subroles are 
dedicated to production proper, while other sub-
roles are dedicated to maintenance of relations with 
customers/ suppliers. 
More formally, let us consider the set R of trans-
formation roles, 
R={r1, ... ,rK}. 
We assume that there is a set W ~ W of principal 
resources and collection of subsets Wk, k = 1, ... , K. 
Each transformation role is associated with a subset 
Wk . Suppose that Wk is the set of principal resources 
among Wk: 
We assume that the collection of sets Wk constitutes 
a partition of set W: 
K 
W=LJWk. wknW1=0, k # 1. 
k=l 
4.4. Agent layer 
Agents constitute independent entities which com-
bine one or more transformation roles and form 
supplier/consumer relationships with each other. 
Let us define this notion formally. By P we denote 
the set of agents, 
P = {p1, ···,PM). 
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Each agent can be associated with some subset of 
transformation roles Rm s; R. Recall that for each role 
r; correspond some set of resources W;. 
4.5. Supplier/consumer graph 
Resource graph and mapping between roles and 
agents permit to define supplier/consumer graph. This 
graph plays fundamental role in multi-agent system. 
It is oriented graph (P , D) with vertices which coin-
cide with the set of agents P and set of oriented arcs 
D s; P x P . For each vertex p; of this graph let us 
define the set of all resources fl; produced by corre-
sponding agent: 
fl;= LJ Wj 
j:rj ER; 
and by Qt the set of all consumed resources for this 
agent: 
flt= U wt. 
j .k: vkEWj ,rjER; 
Similar to resource graph for each vertex p; let us 
define the sets of predecessors P/ and children P;- : 
pi+= {pj : (pj, p;) ED}, 
P;- ={pr (p;, Pj) ED}. 
The meaning of this structure is the following. The 
vertices correspond to production and/or transforma-
tion of different resource sets. Oriented arcs point from 
suppliers to producers/consumers. Resources flow in 
the direction of these arcs and money flows in the 
opposite direction. Thus, the set P/ is the set of all 
agents which supply resources needed for production 
and transformation of resources from fl; and the set 
P;- is the set of all agents which consume resources 
from fl;. There should be the following relation bet-
ween this graph and resource graph: 
Wk+ s; u Qj, Vk: Vk E fl;, 
j:pjEP;+ 
which means simply that for all resources produced 
by an agent p; the set of resources needed for its 
production is among the set of all resources produced 
by suppliers of this agent. 
4.6. Market layer 
This layer describes relations between agents 
as they are unfolded in time. They are perceived 
as flow of resources along the supplier/consumer 
graph. 
4.6.1. Time structure 
The system is evolving in discrete time t = 
0, I, ... . The units of this time can correspond to dif-
ferent units of real time, from months to years. The 
consumer/ supplier graph described in the previous 
section depends on time. This is done in order to de-
scribe such phenomena as emergence of new agents, 
union of different agents into one agent, change of 
consumer/supplier relations described by oriented 
arcs of this graph, and change of roles played by 
different agents: 
(P, D) = (P(t), D(t)), 
P(t) = {p1 (t), . .. , PM(t ) (t)}, 
4.6.2. State of the system 
The state of the system S(t) at time t consists of 
the states of all agents: 
S(t) = (S1 (t), . .. , SM(t)). 
The state of a agent p; consists of the following com-
ponents: 
S;(t) = {w;(t), d;(t) , l/l;(t), ntct), n;-(t)), 
where 
w;(t) 
d; (t) 
l/I; (t) 
nt<t) 
n;-(t) 
current available resources; 
current money supply; 
current production/investment strategy; 
current consumer contracts; 
current supplier contracts; 
In following sections we describe in more detail 
each of these components. 
4.6.3. Current available resources and money flow 
The vector of all resources owned by agent at the 
beginning of period t is described by its quantity and 
attributes: 
w;(t) = {(Zij(t), V;j(t)), j: \Jj E fl;}. 
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Let us recall that money is included in the set of re-
sources and have index 0, i.e. vo denotes money. We 
could manage it in our model as any other resource. 
However, due to specific economic function of money 
we prefer to treat it separately and denote the current 
amount of money available to agent p; as d;(t). In 
case if vo E il;, we have 
d;(t) = Z;o(t). 
Usually there are some constraints on the possible val-
ues of resources, for example in the most cases they 
should be nonnegative. Generally, admissible sets Uj 
are given such that 
(w;(t),d;(t)) E Uj. j =I, .. ., J. (5) 
4.6.4. Current production/investment strategy 
Let us consider again production functions from 
(3). We want to generalize their definition to include 
delay phenomena. For example, it takes some time 
to train human resources and acquire necessary tech-
nological capabilities. Generally, some resources are 
produced within the same time period, while other 
resources become operational after some time after 
initial investment in terms of money and other re-
sources is made. Similarly, some types of needs of 
end users may be satisfied for some time after acqui-
sition of certain resources is made. We describe these 
phenomena by allowing the amount and attributes of 
resources produced at time t to depend on resources 
from consumption set at current and previous periods 
of time: 
(~k(t) , vk(t)) = 1/rL((Zj(r) , Vj(r)), 
j: Vj E w:, t-Cil,,;;r,,;;t), 
(6) 
where eil is the depth of the memory of the system 
which can differ for different resources. Here we al-
low the production function to depend explicitly on 
agent p;. 
The production/investment strategy If!; (t) has 
duration which lasts from time t to time t + tl/J 
which can be different for different strategies. At 
each time r: t,,;; r,,;; t + tl/J it involves decision 
lf!;(t, r): 
lf!;(t) = {lf!;(t, r), t,,;;r,,;;t +t1JJ). (7) 
Each such decision consists of decisions lf!;k(t, r) for 
all resources which belong to production set il; of 
the agent p;: 
Each resource strategy lf!;k(t, r) consists of two 
parts: production part If/;~ (t, r) and consumption part 
lfl;k (t, r ). Production part is simply quantity and at-
tributes of resource vk which is planned at time t to 
produce at time r: 
while consumption part consists of all resources nec-
essary to consume at time r in order to produce 
resources defined by production strategy: 
Obviously, production strategy lf!S (t, r) and con-
sumption strategy lfl;k (t, r), t ,,;; r ,,;; f !JJ are connected 
with production functions (6). 
From the definition of production strategy follows 
that the total amount zj of resource Vj with attributes 
Vj needed to be consumed in order to execute the 
production strategy at time t can be expressed as 
follows: 
zj = L zj(t). (8) 
k: VkE!2;. (:j (1). vj (1 ))El/J;k (1 .I), vj (t)=Vj 
In case of money z() which has empty attribute this 
expression becomes: 
Zo = L z()(t). (9) 
k: VkE!2;,(z~(l).0)El/J;k(t,t) 
4.6.5. Current consumer contracts 
This describes relations between agent p; and 
its suppliers from the set P/(t) which is the 
set of its predecessors on the consumer/supplier 
graph. A contract q is defined by the following 
quantities: 
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where 
iq the number of consumer agent; 
jq the number of supplier agent; 
kq the number of supplied resource; 
t~ the time of the contract beginning; 
t/ the time of the contract ending; 
and (Zq (r), vq (r), rrq (r)), respectively, quantity, at-
tributes and unit price of resource vkq which agent Pjq 
supplies to agent Piq at time r . 
In the case that contract involves borrowing money, 
i.e. kq = 0 then Vq(r) = 0 and rrq(r) means the 
amount of money to return at time period r. 
Thus, the results of execution of contract q at time 
r are the following: 
- agent Piq receives from agent Pjq resource vkq with 
quantity and attributes (Zq(r), vq(r)); 
- agent Pjq receives from agent p;q amount of money 
rrq (r)zq (r) . 
The set of all contracts present in the system at time 
t is denoted by Q(t) . 
The flow of resources follows direction of arcs in 
consumer/supplier graph, while the flow of money is 
opposite to this direction. In order for contract q E 
Q (t) to be admissible it should satisfy a set of con-
straints, for example 
Vkq E Qjq, 
i.e. resource vkq is among resources produced by agent 
Pjq. The set of consumer contracts for agent p; is then 
defined as the set of all contracts which have Pi as 
consumer agent and are active at time t: 
n +( ) { . . i f) i f = q: lq = I, tq '( t '( fq • (11) 
This set defines the set of arcs in consumer/supplier 
graph: 
( pj, Pi) E D(t) ¢> 3q E nt(t):j = jq. 
The following expression defines the total amount Zk 
of resource vk with attributes Vk received by agent p; 
from execution of contracts: 
Zk = Zq(t). (12) 
q : qEnt<r) .kq=k ,vq(t)=v• 
Some contracts involve borrowing money. The total 
amount zg of money borrowed during time period t 
equals: 
zg = Zq (t). (13) 
The amount of money z0 spent on debt servicing 
equals 
7rq(t) (14) 
q: qEnt<r),kq=O 
and the total amount of money z() spent by agent Pi 
on contracts not involving borrowing equals 
( 15) 
4.6.6. Current supplier contracts 
Following definition ( 10) of contract from the previ-
ous section, the set of current supplier contracts n;- (t) 
for agent p; includes all contracts q E Q(t) which 
are active at time t and contain agent p; as supplier 
agent: 
(16) 
The following expression defines the total amount Zk 
of resource Vk with attributes vk supplied by agent Pi 
in accordance with contracts: 
Zk = Zq(t). (17) 
q: qEn,-(1).kq=k ,vq(l)=v• 
We are interested here in agents which do not lend 
money. The total amount of money z0 received 
by such agents from fulfilling supplier contracts 
equals 
za= I: rrq(t)zq(t). (18) 
q: qEn,-(1) 
4. 7. Flow of resources 
Flow of resources is governed by supplier /consumer 
contracts and production strategies. Admissible con-
tracts should conform with production strategies in 
such a way that for each agent and each resource 
amount of supplied resource plus amount of con-
sumed resource should not exceed amount of received 
resource plus amount of produced resource and cur-
rent available resource. Taking into account (8), (12) 
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and ( 17) we obtain the following equality for every 
agent Pi : 
Zq (t) 
q: qen;+(l).k9 =k.v9 (t)=vt 
I: z}(t) 
/ : v1en; .c::_?n.vj<n)E'Jl;ju.1> 
ijcl)=vj 
Zq (t) . (19) 
This equation holds for all resources Vk which belong 
to the union of sets Qi and Qt. If some resource 
belongs to Qt, but does not belong to Qi then the 
second and the last terms from the right-hand side of 
( 1 9) disappear. 
Flow of money is considered separately, although 
we could manage it similarly to other resources utiliz-
ing framework of contracts. The profit d)'(t) of agent 
Pi is expressed as the difference between amount of 
money received from supplier contracts and amount 
spent on production and consumption (9), (15) and 
( 18): 
d)'(r) = L rrq(t)zq(t) 
q : qe n ;-Ul 
I: z0<t) 
k: l'tEll; .(:~(1),0)EIP;k (1 ,1) 
7Tq(t)Zq(t) . (20) 
If a is the tax level on profit and f3 the money return 
from agent activities outside the model then consider-
ing relations (13) and (14) for money borrowing the 
money flow becomes: 
di(t + 1) =(I+ {3)di(t) 
+(l -a)max{O,d)'(t)) 
+ min{O, d)'(r)) 
+ L Zq(t) 
q: qent<tJ.kq=O 
7Tq(t). (21) 
q: qent(l).kq=O 
Note that there are constraints (5) on the admissible 
values of available resources and money, most no-
tably nonnegativity constraints. It may happen that 
some of these constraints are not satisfied by pair 
(wi(t + 1), di(t + 1)) defined by Eqs. (19) and (21), 
i.e. 
(wi (t), di (t))EUj 
for some j. This means that current production strat-
egy of agent Pi is not compatible with current con-
tract set. New contracts should be made and/or old 
contracts changed according to rules described in the 
following sections. 
4.8. Strategies of agents 
Each time period t the agents decide which de-
cisions to take. These decisions involve production/ 
investment plan, consumer and supplier contracts and 
offers to other agents. 
In our notations offers Gi (t) of the agent Pi can be 
described by the set of prospective contracts 
Gi(t) = {(Zjk(r), Vjk('r), 7Tjk(r)), 
t !( r !(t + tc), (22) 
which define the amount Zjk(r) of resource Vk with 
attributes Vjk(r) and unit price 7Tjk(r) which agent Pi 
offers to agent Pj at time r . The agent Pj may accept 
this offer, with maybe lesser quantity, and then the 
offer becomes the contract. 
Thus, the strategy Yi (t) of agent Pi at time t consists 
of the following components: 
Yi(t) = {lf/io(t) , nib(t) , ni0(t), Gi(t)), (23) 
where 
lf/io(t) 
nib(t) 
ni[/t) 
Gi(t) 
change to production/investment strategy; 
new consumer contracts; 
new supplier contracts; 
current offer to other agents. 
The quantities IPio(t), nib(t), ni0(t) have a struc-
ture similar to the respective quantities lf/i (t)' ni+ (t), 
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ni- (t) which are part of the state Si (t) of agent Pi 
and are described previously. 
The strategy Yi (t) depends on information Fi (t) 
available to agent Pi at time t . Generally this includes 
partial knowledge about the state of the system and 
the strategies of other agents: 
Fi (t) s; {S(t), Yj (t), j = 1, ... , M}, 
Yi(t) = Yi(t , Fi(t)) . 
The strategy Yi (t, Fi (t)) is selected according to some 
decision principle. Some of such decision principles 
are discussed in the following section. 
4. 9. Performance measures and selection of 
strategies 
Performance measures formalize such notions as 
mission of business unit and its performance, need 
satisfaction for end users. Each agent Pi may have 
more than one performance measure eirO which are 
functions of the agent state and, maybe, the states of 
other agents, like in the case of performance measure 
which formalize market penetration: 
€Jir0 = eir(S(t)), r = 1, ... , n,, (24) 
where S (t) is the state of the system at time t. Through 
the states performance measures depend on the strate-
gies Yj (t) of different agents. Note that even if per-
formance measure of agent Pi depends explicitly only 
on its own state Si (t) it still implicitly depends on 
the strategies of other agents trough current contracts 
nt(t), ni-(t) . 
Among performance measures there would be 
measures of constraint satisfaction (5), like not go in 
debt below a certain level, or measures of contract 
fulfillment. 
An agent should select strategies Yi (t) in order 
to obtain "good" values of its performance mea-
sures. Since some of them could be conflicting, 
there could be different notions of tradeoffs be-
tween different performance measures. Here are some 
examples: 
(1) Staying within desirable sets. Select strategies 
such that 
€Jir(S(t)) E 8ir(t), t = 0, . . . , (25) 
where 8ir(t) are some desirable sets which can 
change with time. 
(2) Maximizing selected criterion with constraints on 
others. Suppose that there is one "the most im-
portant" performance measure €Jio0, like, for ex-
ample, net profit. Then the objective of the agent 
Pi may be to maximize the value of this measure 
with constraints on all others. In case when cur-
rent strategy affects only current period ("myopic" 
case) the problem becomes: 
(3) 
(4) 
max €Jio(S(t)), 
y;(t) 
eir(S(t)) E 8ir(t), r = 1, .. . , n,. 
(26) 
(27) 
Much more often, however, the current strategy 
affects the future states. In this case the problem 
of strategy selection may become 
t+T 
max L tJio(S(r)) , 
y; (r),r ,; r ,; r+T r=r 
eir(S(r)) E eir(r), 
r=l , ... ,n,, t~T~t+T, 
(28) 
(29) 
there may be different dynamic formulations, like 
maximization of selected criterion at the end of 
the planning period of specified length. 
Maximizing integrated criterion. This is the case 
when there is no criterion of paramount impor-
tance, but all criterions have their relative weights 
'A,. In the myopic case such tradeoff strategies can 
be selected by solving the problem 
n, 
max"\"' 'A,€Jir(S(t)) . 
y;(r) L.., 
r=l 
(30) 
Principles of game theory. The principles (25)-
(30) are sufficient for situations when the state 
of an agent Pi does not depend considerably on 
the strategies of other agents, for example the 
agent Pi holds a monopoly on some important 
product/service. Generally, however, the perfor-
mance measures of different agents depend con-
siderably on the strategies of other agents. Game 
theory developed different notions of strategy se-
lection in such conditions. 
For example, in fiercely competitive environment 
the worst case or minimax strategy may give better 
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results than (25)-(30). It selects the best strategy for 
agent Pi in the case when the strategies of all other 
agents are aversive. In the case of (28) and (29) this 
leads to the solution of the following problem: 
t+T 
max min . L);o(S(r}}, (31) 
y;( t ). t <; t <; t+T YJ(t) ,1 .; r <; t + T .1#1 t=t 
Bir(S(r)) E Elir(r), 
r=l, .. ., n,, t ( r(t+T. (32) 
In the case when environment is a mixture of compe-
tition and cooperation other strategies may prove to be 
more advantageous, like Pareto strategies and coali-
tion strategies. 
4.10. Coalitions of agents 
Agents may make a coalition in order to improve 
their performance measures. Generally, there may be 
more than one coalition among agents. Coalitions Ek, 
k = 1, ... , Kc are subsets of the set of agents P and 
make a partition of this set: 
Kc U Ek= P, Ej n Ek = 0, j # k. 
k=l 
Agents belonging to the same coalition select their 
strategies according to common decision principles 
and exchange information. There may be different 
types of coalitions, some of them being outlawed 
by regulating authority. Generally, coalitions are de-
scribed by type of information on which their com-
mon strategies depend and by decision principles. Let 
us describe one such type of coalition. 
Coalition of equal trusting agents in adverse envi-
ronment. In such a coalition Ek each agent knows the 
strategies, performance measures and states of other 
agents belonging to coalition plus some information 
about the state of other agents, but nothing about their 
performance measures and strategies of agents not in-
volved in the coalition: 
Fi(t) = {(Sj(t}, Yj(t}}, j E Ek) u Fi(t}, 
Fi(t) ~ {Sj, j E P\Ek) . 
In this case the decision principle can be Pareto 
optimality within coalition and minimax approach 
toward outsiders. In case of criterion (28) and (29) 
each agent belonging to coalition solves the following 
problem. 
pm ax 
yt ( r ),1~r :;;; 1+T 
IEE; 
t+T 
min LBio(S(r)), 
}j(r) ,t :;;; r :;;; r+ T 
}EP\ Et t=I 
Bir(S(r)) E El;,(r}, 
r=l , . .. , n, , t ( r(t+T, 
where by pmax we denoted Pareto maximum. 
(33) 
(34) 
Coalitions may change their composure due to de-
cisions of particular agents to join other coalitions or 
play on their own accord if they discover that such an 
action improves their performance measures. Proce-
dures of coalition formation and dissolving should be 
specified. 
4.11. Contract adjustment 
This is done when current available resources 
( Wi (t + 1), d; (t + 1)) obtained according to ( 19) and 
(21) do not satisfy constraints (5) and this cannot be 
adjusted by making new consumer contracts accord-
ing to offers G j (t) advanced by other agents. This 
situation may occur, for example, when end users 
decided to terminate some contracts. Then current 
contracts and/or production policy should be changed 
in order to allow the current state of the agent Pi re-
enter into admissible set. Contract adjustment brings 
about penalties which are reflected in the money 
flow. 
4.12. Evolution of the system 
Now we are ready to describe the time evolu-
tion of the simulation model defined in the previous 
sections. 
Initialization . At time t = 0 initial states Si (0) are 
assigned to all agents and simulation iterval [O, T] is 
selected. 
Generic step. At the beginning of time period 
t agents are in the states S; (t) and the current set 
of agents P(t) is divided in coalitions Ek(t), k = 
I, .. . , Kc(t) . The following actions are performed 
during the step t: 
M. Bonatti et al. I Robotics and Autonomous Systems 24 (1998) 93-113 Ill 
(1) New agents are introduced and, possibly, some 
old agents are eliminated which changes the set 
of agents to P(t + 1). 
(2) New coalitions are formed or old coalitions are 
confirmed which brings the coalition set to Ek (t + 
1), k = 1, .. . , Kc(t + 1). 
(3) By each agent p; E P(t + 1) the following actions 
are performed: 
• Information F; (t) is obtained according to par-
ticipation in coalition. 
• Strategy y; is selected according to one of 
decision principles discussed above in con-
cordance with other coalition partners. This 
strategy involves making offer to other agents, 
selection of new consumer and supplier con-
tracts and adjustment of production/investment 
plan. 
• New state S; (t + 1) is computed according to 
( 19) and (21 ). If it enters in admissible set then 
go to step t + 1. If not, try to re-enter in admis-
sible set by modifying strategy and/or current 
contracts. If this is impossible then this agent 
is eliminated on the next step. 
5. Summary 
We presented here a general methodology for mod-
eling of complex distributed multi-agent systems and 
presented a prototype of the simulator INFOGEN for 
simulation of such systems. We had as reference point 
its application to modeling of information industry, 
although it is applicable also for other multi-agent 
systems. 
There are still many research issues to be clari-
fied. As we have seen multi-agent systems may exhibit 
widely different dynamics under different values of 
system parameters . Purely mayopic and adaptive be-
havior generates instability and discontinuities which 
is quite clear even from "driving a car by looking 
backwards". The explicit introduction of uncertainties, 
"looking forward" agents and "moving horizon" dy-
namics stabilizes the system's behavior and its equi-
librium states. It would be also highly desirable to 
develop tools which would permit to identify regions 
of stability of certain equilibrium points and regions 
where one strategy is superior with respect to another 
strategy. One possibility to develop such tools is to 
extend to the multi-agent systems the theory of sen-
sitivity analysis developed for nonsmooth stochastic 
optimization [9,14,15], and discrete event dynamic 
systems [2,19,20,21,24,26] . 
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